The Transport Politic

» Plan, yet to be fully laid out, would devote billions to 4,000 miles of new railways, in addition to roads, air traffic, and transit. Congressional approval is unlikely to be easy.

President Obama, at least, is not yet willing to give up on his Administration’s hope to eventually connect 80% of the American population to intercity rail service. After committing $8 billion to such services a year and a half ago during negotiations for the stimulus, the President announced today that he would campaign to devote $50 billion to an improved transportation system, including more spending on high-speed rail, road maintenance, local transit, and better runways. Any such program would require Congressional approval before moving forward.

The Administration’s new proposal seems to be an attempt to accomplish the goals of a new transportation bill without actually passing reauthorization legislation. The previous bill expired in 2009; spending is now being determined year-to-year and being partially sponsored by general income tax revenues, rather than being determined over a six-year period being sponsored entirely by fuel tax revenues, as was until recently the modus operandi.

The federal government currently spends about $50 billion annually on all forms of transportation.

At this time, it is not clear how much enthusiasm the Congress holds for what is being portrayed as a second stimulus, nor how much can actually be built with the money, which would be invested over a period of six years though mostly at the front end. Neither the House nor the Senate, both under Democratic control but threatened in this fall’s elections by increasingly popular anti-spending Republicans, seem particularly thrilled about the idea of voting for a new government program. Few specifics of the proposal have been revealed, other than that the Administration is again promoting its idea for a national infrastructure bank, a program it has had in mind since assuming office in early 2009.

Nor has the President addressed the all-consuming question of how many jobs this program will produce. Despite the fact that there is evidence that investment in public transportation operations is one of the most effective ways to get people back to work, what little has been said about this new spending seems to indicate that it would only go to capital investments. Funding will not be debt-based, the President said, though the exact mechanism to raise the needed dollars has yet to be worked out.

Mr. Obama’s framework, he claimed today, would result in the renovation of 150,000 miles of existing roadways, the construction of 4,000 miles of new railways, and the rehabilitation of 150 miles of runways. Evidently, money is also to be earmarked for the public transit New Starts program, which funds major expansion programs, usually in the form of rail rapid transit. The exact distribution of funds has not been addressed, nor has a decision-making process about worthy projects been established.

The proposal, though certainly a refreshing move from an Administration that over the last few months had threatened a “freeze” on spending, may simply not go far enough to produce effective change, especially for the national high-speed rail program. Even if all the money were spent on fast trains, the majority of money would have to be devoted to just one corridor: the California High-Speed project, which is in need of $20 to $30 billion in federal funds to be completed, depending on the level of private investment pinpointed. As things stand, with the $50 billion to be spread out between all modes in the transportation system, far less will actually be spent on any one mode. This means that smaller, incremental projects are likely to be the biggest beneficiaries here.

Mr. Obama, mimicking what has become standard industry commentary, suggested again that a national infrastructure bank be created to fund transportation projects. It’s a problematic concept from a variety of perspectives, including the fact that unless it is used purely on projects that make money in the long term (generally not rail or transit), it isn’t actually a new funding source, it’s just a different way of distributing existing money.

This second stimulus could be structured to include what the Administration is calling a “long-term framework” for national transportation policy, arguably vital for a country that lacks true goals for the future of its mobility system. Mr. Obama stated his desire to put high-speed rail “on an equal footing” with the rest of the transportation system. The program would also consolidate 100 transportation programs, supposedly with the goal of streamlining operations in the Department of Transportation, a move that was suggested by House Transportation and Infrastructure Chairman James Oberstar (D-MN) more than a year ago.

Instead of relying on a transportation reauthorization bill to accomplish a change in policy, the Congress may have an opportunity to promote similar goals if it moves forward with the passage of this bill. For those promoting alternatives to an automobile-centric transportation network, that may be a good thing, since this program will not rely on an increase in the gas tax to fund new spending, arguably a necessary change if we are to accept the fact that the current user fee model for funding is not only obsolete but inappropriate for today’s needs.

Most importantly, though, despite its optimism Mr. Obama’s proposal is coming at the exactly wrong time from a political perspective. Democrats have been slow to embrace significant spending even on transportation, arguably a matter that is of bipartisan interest. Why will they do so now? And if they do, will they choose to advance the policies the President has suggested are most important to him, like high-speed rail and transit, or will they attempt to placate suburban and rural interests with more highway spending?

Update: As commenter Jim points out, the Administration may be suggesting this proposal as the transportation bill reauthorization itself, which would add a total of $175 billion over the next six years, not just $50 billion. Whether that is true remains to be seen — we have yet to see the actual plan.

» This week’s big news. Open thread in the comments.

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The Transport Politic:

• European transport agencies consolidate intercity rail operations in face of competition
• Stations picked, huge automated transit project for Paris is closer to realization
• Promoting a second stimulus with the goal of actual job creation

Next American City:

• Minding the Gaps: Streetcar plans in Detroit and New Orleans (in the magazine)
• New Orleans could be up for radical change with the removal of a highway
• If transit investment produces jobs, why isn’t there more of it?

Canadians like transit

• The Canadian federal government has agreed to commit $265 million to the Waterloo light rail project, which will extend into Kitchener and Cambridge. The local governments involved may not be able to find the rest of the funds to pay for the almost $700 million program.
• Elsewhere in Ontario, the provincial government has found $600 million to fund the light rail system there, which will replace a busway with a rail tunnel through downtown. Though that project is being contested in the upcoming mayoral election, this money makes its construction more likely. Ontario has already agreed to spend billions on the Toronto area transit system.
• Calgary planners propose two express buses and a streetcar all serving the airport. Many politicians, on the other hand, want a light rail extension there.

High-speed rail takes time

• South Korea, which already has a high-speed system roughly based on the French TGV, plans a major expansion to connect all of the country’s major cities. Links to North Korea, however, aren’t likely for a long time.
• Siemens promotes its trains in ads across the internet, hoping to win commissions for contracts in California, Florida, and the Midwest. For now, though, the only company that will for sure build new trains for the U.S. is Spanish concern Talgo, which will construct trains for Wisconsin.
• Despite the big benefits of high-speed rail for California, people on the Peninsula are continuing to fight its development. A Palo Alto committee declares “no confidence” in the project. But the High-Speed Rail Authority reaffirms its push for an alignment through that city.

Bikes!

• Washington, D.C. has begun the installation of its new bike sharing stations, Beyond DC reports. The first station was actually put up in Arlington, but the whole system should be up and operating later this fall. I questioned the density of the system earlier in the summer.

Image above: Montréal Métro, from Flickr user David Salafia (cc)

» Unlike the first stimulus, whose benefits will produce major investments in new transit systems and intercity rail, a second economic push could highlight operations support.

In case you missed the news, the first economic stimulus wasn’t a panacea for the struggling U.S. economy.

Unemployment, around 8% when the bill was passed last spring, has expanded to 9.6%, and the economy isn’t growing nearly as quickly as is necessary to increase employment too full-employment levels. Many economists have suggested from the beginning of discussions at the end of 2008 that the scale of the spending — at less than one trillion dollars — was simply not enough to offset the decline experience in the private sector thanks to the recession. With the original stimulus spending basically entirely accounted for, the government’s intervention has prevented an economic catastrophe, but that fact doesn’t provide much encouragement for the millions of people who want to work but can’t.

Since March 2009, there have been active discussions about the possibility of a second stimulus to address the limitations of the first. President Obama hinted at that possibility in his speech on the pull-out of U.S. troops from Iraq earlier this week, and Paul Krugman now suggests that the Administration may be planning to make a move next week. Its former pledge to “freeze” spending may have to be put off in response to a difficult economic environment. The scale of the proposal, which has absolutely no guarantee of passage, is likely to be far smaller than the first — but transport could play an important role.

The first stimulus prioritized mobility: Spending on highways, transit, and, most notably, high-speed rail represented $45. 2 billion in total expenditures, roughly doubling the typical annual federal commitment to transportation. Much of that money went to projects that were more about long-term goals than current job growth, however. For instance, as far as I know, none of the money to be spent on fast trains has yet been put into actual construction.

A second stimulus — more like a jobs bill — would have to focus on employment as its primary goal. In transportation, some have suggested that spending on transit produces more jobs than spending on highways, but a new study by the Transportation Equity Network (TEN) is even more specific: The best way to create new opportunities for jobless people is to invest in public transportation operations, like the running of buses and trains. That makes sense, since in essence paying for people to drive is the quickest and most reliable government jobs program. Construction projects take years to set up and much of the money goes to capital inputs, not labor.

If Washington committed to spending several billion dollars on transit operations, that money could be spent almost immediately on hiring people to drive and maintain systems all around the country. The result would be a fantastic increase in service levels, including in many cities that have had to cut the frequency of buses and trains in response to declining tax revenues. The benefits, thus, will be multi-faceted from the beginning, increasing transit offerings for the average rider and adding thousands of well-paying jobs.

The government currently has almost a blanket prohibition on the use of federal funds for the purposes of operations.

The TEN study suggests that a $5 billion investment in transit operations could result in the creation of 200,000 direct and indirect jobs over the course of five years. There would be nothing to complain about that result. And it would be hard for conservatives to claim that the public sector was stepping on the toes of private businesses, since they’re not involved in transit operations anyway.

I have suggested in the past that there are some negative long-term consequences of using federal money to pay for transit operations, especially since that commitment is not open-ended. We don’t want to give local and state authorities the impression that they can back off from their current spending on transit. On the other hand, from a socio-economic perspective, it may make more sense for Washington to entirely take over this aspect of transit funding, leaving the costs of construction for lower levels of government to tackle.

On the other hand, the government could choose to invest massively in construction projects like new high-speed rail lines or urban metro programs. Due to a decline in private sector activity, there is large unemployment in this industry that could be partially re-mediated with such spending. Yet with the exception of some bus rapid transit and light rail proposals, few proposed corridors are ready for immediate construction. If the goal of a second stimulus is to promote job creation, the simplest way to do so would be to spend on transit operations.

Whether the President’s call for more federal spending will receive any reception from a skeptical Congress is another issue. In this very much anti-government election year, it may be too much to ask for positive news from Washington.

» Three intersecting lines will serve mostly circumferential routes around the Paris city core, providing fast trips to a currently under-served clientele.

In the Western World, the most significant rapid transit project currently being contemplated is Paris’ 96-mile Grand Paris network that would extend brand-new automated rapid transit lines across and around the region at the eye-popping price of more than twenty billion euros. If adequately financed, it would be a huge undertaking designed to speed travel between locales now at the periphery of the region’s fast transit network, spurring housing and population growth in the metropolitan area’s suburbs.

Announced more than a year ago by conservative President Nicolas Sarkozy, the program has no assurance of being completed. While regional authorities are currently constructing dozens of miles of new light rail lines, several busways, and a few metro extensions, almost all in the inner suburbs, the national government’s program has yet to be funded thanks to its extraordinary cost. The RER regional rail program, the last major transit program conceived for the French capital, radiates fast trains from the city core and was conceived in the 1960s, and little has happened since. Continuing the current situation could mean decades of only minor improvements in mobility for the nine million people living just outside the walls of the City of Paris.

Yet the Réseau Primaire de Transport du Grand Paris (primary transport network of greater Paris) may be coming to life. This week, the government opened public debate on the project, revealing the extensive studies it has completed on potential alignments for the rail corridors, including proposed station sites. And the Sarkozy Administration has committed to €4 billion to the Société du Grand Paris, the semi-autonomous organization that will build the project and invest in eight major development sites that will have prime access to the network.

If the program is approved, the Société would take on 40 years of debt financing to sponsor the €21.4-23.5 cost, to be paid back mostly through deals made on real estate in station areas.

The project would encompass 155 km (96 miles) of new lines that would be added to the existing automated 5.5-mile Line 14 Metro that currently runs along a southeast-northwest route through Paris. Three routes would be offered: a 50 km Blue Line from Orly Airport to Charles de Gaulle Airport, via the existing Line 14; a 75 km Green Line from Orly Airport to Charles de Gaulle Airport, via the La Défense financial district west of Paris (with 21 km shared with the Blue Line); and a 60 km Red Line from La Défense to Le Bourget Airport, via the southern and eastern suburbs. Commute times for suburban residents hoping to reach destinations outside of Paris will be decreased significantly, with average train speeds a very respectable 40 mph thanks to few stations (give or take 40, depending on the final alignment chosen) and very high frequencies thanks to automation. At peak hours on some segments, trains will arrived every 85 seconds.

Construction could begin in 2013, with completion of the full project by 2023. By 2035, the system is expected to serve between two and three million daily riders.

The alternative is scary. Little new investment in new public transportation corridors would foster extreme congestion on lines entering Paris and increased automobile use in suburb-to-suburb travel; 80% of such commutes are already made by car. The inner suburbs — made up of three départements, Hauts-de-Seine, Val-de-Marne, and Seine-Saint-Deins — are surprisingly dense, more than San Francisco at 17,000 people per square mile, enough for adequate ridership on high-capacity transit lines and not sprawling in the traditional sense. Paris itself has 53,000 inhabitants per square mile, New York City 27,500.

Nevertheless, the government’s project is not universally liked. Its focus on station-area development at major business districts and airports promotes environments designed for middle-to-upper income groups; the new system could benefit real estate investors marketing to their needs more than anyone else. That’s problematic considering the Paris region’s existing segregation of income groups, with wealthier inhabitants mostly to the west of the city and the poor to the northeast. Moreover, the extension of the northeast and southwest segments of the system far from the urban core (some of which is still farmland!) seems more likely to promote exurban development than reinforce dense areas.

The Socialist Party, which controls the regional government and at least for now seems well positioned to win the presidency from Mr. Sarkozy in 2012, has advocated a separate 37-mile Arc Express program, which would circle around the City of Paris at a much closer radius, with far more stations and average speeds of about 25 mph. That project will be submitted for public debate in the coming months.

The Sarkozy government’s project is far more ambitious and encompasses 70% of the Arc Express alignment. But it could use some cutbacks; specifically, the Green Line’s southwest segment seems unnecessary. The Red and Blue Lines are each expected to attract about one million riders by 2035 while the Green Line will move half as many; even so, the Green Line is expected to cost as much to build as the other two combined.

All that said, this program is unique as it represents a major investment in a public transit project that is primarily aimed at improving the livelihoods of those living outside of the city core, not typically the first priority of transit planners. Yet it’s an especially important goal considering the increasing concentration of the poor and lower-middle class in the suburbs (both in France and in the United States). In massive metropolitan areas like the Paris region, there are few good options for improved mobility other than the provision of fast transit between big destinations — so it’s not like the installation of “cheaper” light rail, busways, or the like would do much to aid in the ability of people to get from one place to the next.

Only with truly rapid transit can people be granted easy movement throughout regions, and that’s what this project would provide.

The lines are being planned to interface directly with existing transit lines, encouraging multimodal transfers; of the 40 or so stations that could be built, 37 are in correspondence with existing or planned fixed-guideway public transportation. Bus lines would be redrawn to shuttle passengers to and from stations. And the government’s plan to encourage new construction around stations, and in fact to use proceeds from the development to pay back the costs of the system, is at least fiscally sound, though not necessarily socially so.

Update: I felt that this discussion could be better informed by positioning the project on a map showing the relative densities of the neighborhoods and cities in the Paris region. I’ve added the map below:

(Base density image from IAU-IdF)

» As Veolia closes in on Transdev, Deutsche Bahn completes acquisition of Arriva. All before much real competition has begun.

Compared to Western Europe, the U.S.’s intercity passenger rail system seems positively easy to understand, with exactly one major carrier. The Old Continent has a glut of operators providing services along thousands of miles of travel corridors, representing billions of rides every year. In Western Europe, with serious competition in play in the United Kingdom, Germany, and the Netherlands, this makes for a complex system of corporate link-ups and competing systems, as the chart above shows.

With European Union regulations promoting competition in international services across the continent beginning this year and in domestic services over the next few, the system will get a whole lot more complicated. That is likely to benefit most directly three major corporate entities: The German national rail company DB, the French national rail company SNCF, and private company Veolia Transport.

DB completed the acquisition of the Arriva Group last week, making a wholly-owned subsidiary of the British company that operates several rail franchises in the United Kingdom, Germany, and the Netherlands. Though the German businesses of Arriva will be divested as part of a deal with European regulators, this will give DB a major foothold in the U.K. to join with its already clear dominance in its home market.

Meanwhile, the merger of Veolia Transport and Transdev, both French companies, seems likely to create a similar powerhouse if the deal goes through as expected either in 2011 or early 2012. The merged group, representing almost €10 billion in annual revenues, is primarily involved in public transit operations, but it is advancing rapidly towards increasing its presence on the intercity rail market. Veolia announced late last year that it is working with Italian national rail operator Trenitalia to run high-speed trains into France.

SNCF has been expanding its international presence through its Keolis division, which already runs trains in Britain, Germany, and the Netherlands.

Each of these companies is either completely owned by a national government or has some government involvement in its organization. National European rail operators are relatively autonomous in their decision-making. Still, this could produce an interesting situation in the near future in which, for example, a division of the government of Germany could operate trains between destinations in France and the United Kingdom.

The dominance of these three players is likely to upset the current deals that allow high-speed trains to travel between European countries, since until recently the major national rail companies stuck to their own countries. In essence, E.U. regulations will allow any operator to use tracks in any of member countries as long as they pay the required track use fees and win a schedule slot. DB is planning to run its ICE trains through the Channel Tunnel, competing directly with primarily SNCF-controlled Eurostar; NTV, a new fast train company partly owned by SNCF, will compete with Trenitalia beginning later this year; through Keolis, SNCF has said it may run TGVs into Germany for the first time without agreement from DB.

The sheer size of companies like DB, SNCF, and Veolia increases their ability to bid for intercity rail operating contracts in countries across the continent. This seems likely to put into difficulty the existing national operators not only in the countries where competition is already accepted but also eventually in places like Spain, currently monopolized by national service Renfe.

Notes about the chart above: To simplify matters, I’ve only included the U.K., Ireland, France, Spain, Belgium, Luxembourg, Portugal, Germany, and Netherlands; Western Europe is larger than that, but there’s only so much to be shown on one chart. I also have included several deals that are not yet completed, included the Veolia-Transdev merger. In addition, some of the chains of control are simplified, excluding some subsidiaries sitting between corporate HQ and actual operations. Local public transit is not included here.

» Freight companies rejoice now that they won’t have to pay for passenger train delays.

It was inevitable: Distraught by the possibility of having to increasingly open up their tracks to passenger trains, the freight railroad companies have staged an open rebellion against a proposed U.S. policy that would have penalized them if they caused delays.

The rule, which was proposed in May by the Federal Railroad Administration, would have enforced “stakeholder agreements” that went along with funding for new or improved intercity rail routes advanced by state governments. In exchange for a public investment in track, signaling, and the like, freight rail companies would be required to ensure that passenger trains aren’t delayed by oncoming traffic or slowed-down cargo trains.

In the Omaha World-Herald earlier this week, reporter Joe Ruff described some of the opposition to these rules. D.J. Mitchell of BNSF railways, suggested that the situation was stacked against the freight companies since their existing lines simply are not built for trains running at speeds higher than 90 mph whereas the Obama Administration has been adamant in pushing projects that increase maximum speeds to 110 mph along freight corridors. Meanwhile, Ruff quotes Bob Turner of Union Pacific, who argued not only that the passenger trains could delay freight traffic but also that “It’s out land, it’s our rails… This is about the government regulating what happens on our property.”

This was a sad reaction from an industry that could potentially benefit handsomely from the infusion of significant federal dollars. The freight railroads have operated mostly without government help for decades. Yet Washington clearly did not approach this situation with the necessary tact, failing to inform the industry of the proposed rules changes… before they were proposed, which evidently is the way things are supposed to work.

Joseph Szabo, head of the FRA, concluded that the rules were a mistake, and pulled the regulations out of consideration, a move veteran transportation insider Ken Orski dubbed as “sensible.” Orski concluded with a hope that Mr. Szabo “do no harm” to the freight industry, a message most people can agree with but one that provides little sense of what direction the government’s future initiatives need to point. But the decision also seems to suggest that the federal government is unwilling to mess with the freight industry no matter the costs. Is that an acceptable position for the future of the national transportation system in general?

The fundamental problem is that the U.S. government has failed to produce a guiding document that lays out the national goals for the railway system, both in terms of both freight and passenger movement. The national rail plan, whose preliminary draft was released last fall, is by all evidence likely to be a manifesto of vague, uncontroversial ideas, with few specific “plans” for the country’s future mobility. This means that the manner in which the DOT awards intercity rail grants — generally on a state-to-state basis, without much consideration of national needs — is likely to be the way it’s done over the next few years as well.

It also means, in more direct response to the issue posed here, that the government has failed to mediate a compromise between the proponents of freight and passenger rail service. The difficulties raised over the recent proposals by the FRA are only the start of things. For the future of American intercity rail, the government has a responsibility to take further steps to coordinate policy so that it benefits both sides of the rail equation, but it has not done so thus far.

As I discussed last month, despite the fact that allowing trains of different speeds (freight trains are slower than high-speed trains) would (and does) cause problems, there is significant ground for compromise that would allow both services to be improved substantially over the next few years. Notably, were the government to encourage joint use of tracks in city centers by rival freight companies, other inner-city corridors could be devoted to passenger rail without much of a problem.

But that won’t be possible unless the federal government abandons the hands-off policy it seems to be enforcing through its recent decision; at some point, if freight railroads benefit from national investments in their tracks, they should face penalties if they prioritize their trains over passenger vehicles. Freight companies may own the tracks, but if they’re getting funding for improvements, they have to compromise to allow passenger trains to operate effectively.

It’s time to develop a dialogue between freight railroad companies and advocates of improved passenger rail. Improvements for both don’t have to be set in opposition to one another.

Image above: C&NW freight train, by Flickr user vxla (cc)

» Choice of transportation mode for new transit capital projects is often just as much a reflection of politics as it is a statement of “objective” technological benefits.

Would it be an indictment of the political system to suggest that most political leaders making decisions about what kind of technology to use in new transit corridors simply don’t care about the relative merits of various transportation modes? If someone were to develop a definitive formula that established, once and for all, the most appropriate technology for any possible corridor, would it matter?

I raise these questions because when put it in the context of actual decision-making by politicians in the United States, the seemingly endless debate between proponents of rail and buses can sometimes appear downright irrelevant.

Bus rapid transit may provide the same capacity as light rail or light rail may be more effective in producing ridership increases or busways may be cheaper to construct or trains may be better transit-oriented development generators. But if there isn’t significant political support for a transportation technology, it doesn’t matter; the only proposals that are built are those that capture the hearts of the people who decide how public funds are spent.

Last week Tampa Mayor Pam Iorio, her region’s biggest cheerleader for better transit, suggested that for new transportation routes, “Bus rapid transit is not acceptable.” The regional transportation agency HART has yet to determine whether it will promote light rail or faster buses for one of the many potential corridors for better transit service. But the Mayor’s statement, backed up by similar nods of approval for trains by HART President David Armijo, suggests that the only politically feasible option is light rail. When voters in the Tampa region go to the polls on November 2nd to determine whether to increase their sales taxes, they will be considering whether to fund rail, not just any sort of improved transit.

On the other hand, up in Maryland, Republican gubernatorial candidate and former Governor Robert Ehrlich Jr. has suggested that he would replace the current (Democratic) governor’s plans for light rail in Baltimore and suburban Washington, D.C. with bus rapid transit projects. Mr. Ehrlich has cited what he claims are the cheaper costs of bus investments, an opinion that may have more to do with reorienting transportation funding towards highways but which still could point towards efficiency in spending, important for any government program.

There are plenty of seemingly reasonable explanations for the rock-hard support of both Ms. Iorio and Mr. Ehrlich for their preferred transit technologies, but the fact is that their statements in favor of one mode or the other are based on emotional responses, not some kind of well thought-through assessment of their communities’ specific needs.

For many politicians in the United States, light rail has attained something of a mythical status, and they’ve been able to transfer the excitement about the mode to their constituents, as proven by the recent proliferation of successfully passed transit sales tax increases usually founded on the assumptions that trains are coming. There’s some good logic to this fact: Trains are sexy and different: For metropolitan areas used to only bus operations, light rail is appealing to the popular imagination in a way that bus rapid transit is simply not because of its similarity to existing services. Even if it is possible to imagine bus lines that are just as performing as light rail, it is hard to communicate that potential to the average person before a vote.

Los Angeles Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa’s successful campaign to advance the Measure R tax increase in 2008 and now his 30/10 transit plan, both of whose products will primarily be new rail lines, is arguably founded on both general enthusiasm for rail services in L.A. and the coinciding promise that the plan will bring those offerings to everywhere in the region. Similarly, the increase in local taxes to fund the extension of the San Francisco Bay Area’s BART rapid transit system into San Jose was endorsed by more than two-thirds of voters in the 2008 election cycle, likely because of the emotional appeal people in the area hold for the BART rail system. There are cheaper and arguably more appropriate alternatives, like a bus rapid transit line or an improvement of commuter rail services in the East Bay, but they weren’t considered because of a lack of political will to advance their development.

The fundamental question for proponents of better transit stuck asking themselves what transportation technology to support is this: Is it more important to argue for a mode that is more technically efficient or one that is emotionally appealing? Could Mayor Villaraigosa have found enough support for his plan had it promoted a series of busways? Is Mayor Iorio’s argument in favor of light rail a response to her recognition that only it will be exciting enough to appeal to voters?

More directly: If it is necessary to intrigue both politicians and the public about a new transit system in order to get it funded, the necessary corollary must sometimes be choosing the wrong transportation mode from a technical perspective in order to satisfy political demands.

All this said, I do not want to imply that the continued discussion about what transportation modes work best is a silly matter; if anything, more research is necessary to answer the questions that continue to enliven debates about the various benefits of different types of transit. If planners can demonstrate conclusively that light rail really does produce higher ridership and more transit-oriented development than bus rapid transit, then they have an obligation to push for its implementation. If, on the other hand, they can show that bus rapid transit can provide all the benefits of light rail at a lower price, then they must do the opposite.

But planners will only be able to make their argument effectively if they are able to frame it in terms that are appealing for the people who control the public’s purse strings, both in the voting booth and behind the mayor’s desk.

» Famed inner-city loop will have to wait on the sidelines as downtown streetcar competes for federal TIGER II funds.

Today is the deadline for applications to the second phase of the U.S. Department of Transportation’s TIGER program, which provides multi-million dollar grants to transportation projects around the nation based on merit. Cities are likely to submit several billion dollars of proposed projects to compete for a $600 million pot. Unlike the first round, in which Tucson, Detroit, and Dallas received funding for their streetcar lines without having to allocate local funds, this time municipalities are required to contribute 20% of the estimated cost of the program.

Atlanta has chosen to submit a 2.6-mile streetcar line for consideration this time. Of total estimated costs of $72 million, the city hopes the federal government will chip in $52 million; the city and the downtown development district have each agreed to pay $10 million. The rail link will serve as an east-west connector right downtown between the Centennial Olympic Park and the Martin Luther King, Jr. Center, mostly along Edgewood and Auburn Avenues east of downtown. With significant local funding, more than 2,000 estimated daily riders, and the potential to encourage transit-oriented development around Georgia State University and the historic Sweet Auburn, this project is well positioned to win a grant from the U.S. DOT.

Atlanta’s previous application for the first round of TIGER grants, a $300 million proposal to bring streetcars from downtown to Arts Center along Peachtree Street, was rejected due to its duplication of the existing MARTA rapid transit route and its lack of a local funding commitment.

Like many cities applying for similar transportation funds from the federal government, Atlanta has had to prioritize. In this city’s case, though, that prioritization comes to the detriment of one of the nation’s most innovative projects: The Beltline. Unlike the proposed streetcar, which in most ways mirrors similar programs across the country, the Beltline advances a different way of thinking about how to build transportation.

Indeed, if the so-called Capital of the New South does not get money from the TIGER II program, it will be thanks to the decision to find U.S. dollars for the Beltline later rather than now. This project has for the past several years at least appeared to be the city’s transportation priority. What happened? Are city council members suffering from a case of attention deficit disorder?

The Beltline — a $2.8 billion, 22-mile trail/light rail line/development engine — appears to fit perfectly the guidelines of the TIGER program, which is supposed to support innovative thinking about transportation investments. Will Atlanta being doing anything different if it spends on a streetcar?

On the other hand, the Beltline really is different than anything else proposed in a U.S. city. Using a series of mostly abandoned freight rail corridors extending in a loop around the city center, the program would produce an elongated necklace of parks, trails, and recreation facilities. Running on roughly the same corridor would be a transit system, likely light rail, providing circumferential movement between the MARTA branch lines.

The Beltline organization agreed not to submit its demand for $13 million in trail elements to the TIGER program in order to improve the city’s chances of winning money for the streetcar.

From one perspective, this was an admirable decision, since the streetcar is closer to being shovel-ready than the Beltline transit element, whose mode choice has not even been made yet. Just as important, since the Beltline is a much larger project than the streetcar it may be able to qualify for the federal government’s New Start major transit capital projects program in the future, once more study of transportation mode alternatives has been completed.

But the U.S. DOT sponsored trail programs in the previous TIGER grants; if this is what can be done for the Beltline now, that’s worth something since it helps begin the necessary future flow of U.S. money into the program. Is it unfair to point out that Atlanta hasn’t exactly been at the cutting edge of public transportation over the past two decades, and that it may have trouble advancing two new rail programs simultaneously? That’s especially concerning considering the city’s plans to extend the streetcar up Peachtree Street. Which does the city value more: The groundbreaking Beltline or the like-so-many-other-cities streetcar?

I may, however, be asking an unfair question. Georgia is advancing rapidly towards approving a measure that would allow Atlantans to vote themselves a regional one-cent sales tax specifically designed to pay for transit expansion projects. Of the $5 billion that could be raised over the next ten years, up to 60% could be earmarked for transit. That would make building both the streetcar and the Beltline perfectly possible.

» This week’s big news. Open thread in the comments.

Follow my Twitter account (@ttpolitic) to get news in real time.

On The Transport Politic:

• U.S. Announces $8.5 Billion in Requests for High-Speed Funds; $2.3 Billion Available
• Can Bike Sharing Work in Cities With Monofunctional Job Centers?
• Chicago’s Parking Fiasco Fails to Stem Calls for Privatization of Infrastructure
• Chicago’s Plans for a High-Speed Airport Link Revived Thanks to Investor Interest

A note on the last article: In discussing the matter of access between Chicago’s downtown and its airport, I neglected to mention two important issues about such links that generally apply to places throughout the country. One, that they’re too often proposed as elixirs (even “money-makers”) for struggling transportation agencies and thus that they are sometimes prioritized over more important projects; and two, that the City of Chicago would do well if it truly thought over the value of such a connection before it pushed its construction. The second is especially relevant considering the clear current federal emphasis on high-speed intercity projects. Last year, French national railroad company SNCF proposed a bypass loop around Chicago, running through the airport, as an essential element of its proposal for a Midwest high-speed rail project, but didn’t suggest a direct fast downtown-airport connection. Perhaps that should put in question what is the more important investment for the whole region.

New Directions for the Old South series on Next American City:

• For an Increasingly Urban Nashville, the Waterfront is the Place for Change
• Driven Over by I-69

Fast Trains Aren’t Easy

For those hoping high-speed rail could be a non-partisan issue, this week likely served as an ugly wake-up call. In Wisconsin, which received hundreds of millions of dollars from the Obama Administration earlier this year, GOP gubernatorial candidate Scott Walker has been making a big deal about how he would return the money if he’s elected to office later this fall. This isn’t new news from Walker, who’s been fighting the project for months, but now he has created a special website designed to criticize the Milwaukee-Madison intercity rail project, which he’s opposing because it would require the state to chip in annual operating subsidies. He prefers investing in roads subsidies instead.

Over at the California High-Speed Rail Blog, Robert Cruickshank has detailed the push by Republican gubernatorial candidate Meg Whitman to delay funding for the high-speed rail project between Los Angeles and San Francisco. Her Democratic rival Jerry Brown supports a project speed-up, whatever that means.

Meanwhile, the Wall Street Journal suggests that the $8.5 billion in requests for funding the DOT received for a $2.3 billion pot earlier this month means that states are backing off from high-speed rail because of the now-required 20% local commitment. This, evidently, is too much for many states, especially those controlled by conservatives who are uninterested in putting up their own money.

Image above: Light rail at Denver’s Union Station, from Flickr user DanTheWebmaster (cc)

» Mayor Richard Daley hopes for a fully privately funded project connecting downtown with O’Hare Airport, but the city should be sure not to give away too much in the process.

Chicago, perhaps like no other city in the United States, has set itself apart as a center of trade, and recently that has been expressed in the growth of its two airports, O’Hare and Midway. With the resurgence of passenger rail promoted by the Obama Administration, it may be able to reassert its dominance in that field; it will sit at the confluence of three upgraded intercity rail lines already at least partially funded: One to St. Louis, another to Detroit, and a third to Milwaukee and Madison.

Now Mayor Richard Daley (D) is promoting a plan to connect the two modes of transportation via an express rail line between the Loop and O’Hare International. This is only the most recent in a long line of proposals designed to establish quick links between the airport and downtown; it is, perhaps fortunately, no more likely of success.

This week, Mr. Daley formed a 17-member exploratory committee to study options, arguing that private investors from around the world had suggested to him that they might be available to help finance the project. The Mayor promised that the municipal government would provide none of the funds for either construction of operation of the program, though he did not rule out the possibility of demanding state or federal dollars to aid in the investment. The new chair of the Regional Transportation Authority is likely on board, being a big supporter of public-private partnerships.

The previous plan for the express rail link, developed earlier this decade, would have included a “superstation” downtown also connected to the local rapid transit network where travelers could drop off bags before boarding trains. The expresses would run along upgraded Blue Line rapid transit tracks; the fast trains would use new bypass tracks to get around the slower-stopping local trains, providing a 25-minute ride between downtown and O’Hare Airport at a cost of between $15 and 20 dollars per rider. Rapid transit currently requires 40 minutes to make the trip. It is likely that any new project would follow similar principles, but the new committee has obviously yet to determine what plans it will advance. If any private investor is involved, changes are likely.

The superstation, located under the Block 37 project, has been partially constructed after a $250 million public investment. But the station is not completed and does not include track connections between the Red and Blue rapid transit lines, one of the primary goals of the project. Nor does it have the check-in facilities necessary to make the express service feasible at this time.

Mr. Daley’s impulse — to promote a new transportation project specifically without committing the public sector to financing its completion — certainly makes sense considering the city’s limited fiscal reserves and its other priorities, but it may also be unrealistic.

For one, reason puts in question the assumption that private investors would be willing to fund the capital costs of the airport line, no matter the cost customers may be asked to pay to ride along it. There are significant obstacles to putting the project into play, including the purchase of new trainsets; the construction of bypass tracks along an elevated line in dense urban neighborhoods; the expansion of an underground station downtown; and the possible need to create a new terminus station at O’Hare Airport. In other words, airport service of the type that’s been discussed before for Chicago would require several hundred million dollars — of somebody’s money.

Just as important, even if the project does move forward, Chicago has a responsibility to ensure that the new airport express service doesn’t intrude on the daily operations of Blue Line trains, which are arguably more important since they serve tens of thousands of riders a day. With bypass tracks, it would be technically possible to run both services on the same corridor, even as one is providing express operations and the other local ones. But ensuring the express nature of the airport trains without dedicated tracks for them would inevitably mean interrupting Blue Line operations. So even with a privately funded project, there is likely to be some loss in terms of efficiency for the publicly funded rapid transit service. That’s a problem.

Moreover, as Toronto’s recent difficulties with its own airport project demonstrate, investors looking to invest in infrastructure like public transportation may want continuous, year-to-year subsidies even just to pay for operations. Chicago certainly isn’t looking to commit to anything like that.

Image above: Chicago O’Hare International Airport Rail Station, from Flickr user ono-sendai (cc)

» As the United Kingdom encourages investors to pony up billions of pounds for its High-Speed 1 route, Chicago’s sell-off of parking assets comes back to bite.

Who knew an investment in public infrastructure could be so profitable? Or rather, are government entities being bamboozled out of the value of their own property?

About two years ago, Chicago Mayor Richard Daley sold off the rights to 75 years of his city’s public parking meters for $1.15 billion to a partnership of private companies led by Morgan Stanley. Mayor Daley pushed the city council to approve the deal, since it would mean a huge cash infusion into a municipal government facing large budgetary shortfalls. And he argued that putting the parking system in the hands of private enterprise would bring in market-based pricing, essential to improve the circulation and distribution of automobiles in the city’s downtown, but impossible to implement because of a lack of political will.

Bloomberg News, however, revealed last week that the private partnership that bought up the spaces expects to generate at least $11.6 billion in revenues over the course of the contract — producing a potential profit of $9.58 billion, twice what some anti-Daley city council staffers predicted in 2008 the city would lose by selling off the meters (an amount that at the time was considered outrageously high). Chicago, meanwhile, has virtually exhausted the initial funds it received from the deal, having done little to adapt to its local government funding shortfalls.

This situation should put a chill in the spine of those who believe that privatization of public infrastructure will benefit the public pocketbook. And it should be a lesson for politicians who advocate balancing the budget in the short-term through the sale of assets that generate income over the long-term.

Yet the City of Chicago continues to consider the leasing out to private corporations of its Midway Airport. Major candidates running for mayor in Toronto are actively discussing the possibility of privatizing parts of that city’s transit system.

And on the other side of the world, Britain’s new conservative government is hyping the lease-off of the 68-mile High-Speed 1 rail line completed in 2007 at a cost to the government of £6 billion. On Tuesday, between two and six investors submitted their final bids (currently undisclosed) for the 30-year concession that officials expect to bring in between £1.5 and 2 billion, enough to aid the cost-cutting government in reducing its deficit.

Evidence from Chicago suggests that if investors are willing to put up £2 billion now, they are likely to make several times that amount over the course of the contract. In other words, by selling off the rights to High-Speed 1, the British government may get a big boost immediately but find itself yearning for more funds several years out. What makes this agreement particularly galling is that the U.K. already had to bail out the (private) constructor of High-Speed 1 and if the private operation that runs the line eventually faces financial difficulties, the government will likely have to do something similar again, just as it has done repeatedly since the recession began.

That’s because when it comes to public infrastructure, the public seems always to take in the losses even as private companies reap out increasing profits.

Moreover, by agreeing to lease out the line, the government basically abandons any hope of using the program for the benefit of the greater good. Granting control of the infrastructure to a profit-motivated enterprise basically ensures putting existing operators in financial trouble. The infrastructure owner seems likely to demand high usage fees, and these may make the provision of low fares more difficult. Is this in the general interest of the public?

Nonetheless, I do not want to suggest that there can be no appropriate role for private entities in the construction and management of public infrastructure. But it may make more sense to keep for-profit businesses involved only on secondary elements of a project, not have them get directly involved in the transportation element.

And in defense of the City of Chicago, Mayor Daley was likely right when he suggested that only in privatization would the city ever see increasing parking fees. But that fact strikes at the heart of the issue: selling off public infrastructure is too often a response to a lack of political will to get what is needed done.

In Chicago’s case, a politician who has won every mayoral election since 1989 claims he wouldn’t be able to assemble support for raising parking rates, so he would prefer handing out profits on meters to a private group than pushing for his cash-poor city to take the same difficult step. In the U.K., an unwillingness to consider other revenue sources forces a debt-ridden government to sell off its most valuable assets rather than milk them for all they’re worth.

For the average person, privatization probably won’t appear to have changed matters much. But the money they spend parking their cars or taking the train will be going into private hands, not public ones.

Image above: Flyover for High-Speed 1 at Ashford Station, from Flickr user Elsie esq (cc)

» London’s experience may provide a useful example for American cities looking to introduce large bike sharing systems.

Bike sharing is growing rapidly as the transportation mode du jour; not only have the standardized bikes and their docking stations invaded most major cities across Europe, but they’re now headed towards introduction in a number of American cities as well. Before investing full-scale in the purchase of thousands of new bikes and the installation of hundreds of docks, U.S. planners should be looking closely at previous experience to determine best practices in system design.

Last month, I laid out my concerns that Washington, D.C.’s new Capital Bikeshare doesn’t plot its stations close enough together for the system to be effective, at least based on the manner in which Montréal and Paris have implemented their networks. The lack of station density could prevent easy use by day-to-day users because of difficulties related to finding stations in some neighborhoods.

London, which just introduced its Barclays Cycle Hire system using 6,000 Montréal Bixi bikes and 400 docking stations spread out across 17 square miles of the center city, does not have the same problem, since its stations are tightly packed in a circumscribed area. One difficulty it might have, however, could potentially be even more problematic: Because of London’s land use geography, commuting patterns are overwhelmingly unidirectional, towards the center in the mornings and away from it in the afternoons. This may put a strain on bike sharing, since to work, the concept requires a relatively even pattern of bike pick-ups and drop-offs at every station.

American cities, which feature similar concentrations of office jobs in the inner-city core and distributions of residential areas in peripheral zones, must evaluate how London is handling this problem and develop their own coping techniques before moving forward with a major spending program.

Consider the images below of usage distribution of London’s bike share, products of a mapping system developed by Oliver O’Brien. In the mornings, thousands of people bike from the outside of the Cycle Hire zone into its interior; by the afternoon, this produces a situation in which the majority of stations in the center are full (red) and the majority of those along the edge are empty (blue). In the evening, on the other hand, the movement of commuters from the core and into the periphery produces the opposite situation, where the stations in the center are empty and those on the periphery are full.

For commuters intending to use the bikes during off-hours, this is extremely problematic. If you want to ride from the London jobs center to the outside of the Cycle Hire zone at 9 PM, for instance, it may be virtually impossible to find a bike; even if you do, you might have a difficult time finding a station at which to dock your bike. The same can be said for a commuter attempting to make the reverse commute at 11 AM.

Perhaps more important, this situation is difficult to handle from an organizational standpoint. Because of the fact that the managers of the system want to alleviate these problems, they have 14 trucks (one of which is pictured at the top) which transfer bikes from full stations to empty ones. Other cities with bike sharing have a similar transportation method, but London’s may be particularly overcharged because of the monofunctionality of many of the city’s neighborhoods.

The worse-case situation seems to be occurring at the bike share docks adjacent to the Kings Cross and Waterloo intercity stations. There, the Cycle Hire management company Serco is simply leaving dozens of non-docked bikes in front of full stations, cluttering up the sidewalks sometimes for hours in anticipation of them being moved elsewhere. There are a few solutions that could be implemented relatively easily, including the hiring of more trucks to move bikes around and the creation of more docking points at places with heavy demand for parking.

But both of these would require a ramp-up in operations costs. One of the great benefits of a well-designed bike sharing system is that the riders can do the moving for you, thereby reducing the onus on the operator to make sure there are an adequate number both of bikes and of empty docks at every station.

Some cities, like Paris and Barcelona, have it a bit more easy, simply because office and residential uses in those cities are not nearly as segregated as they are in London, making the flow of bikes in the sharing system multidirectional. In other words, a mixed-use city is most appropriate for the implementation of a bike share system. It is indicative that the one place in Paris where there is a massive concentration of jobs but few residences — at La Défense, just outside of the city limits– has virtually no access to the Vélib bike sharing network. The city’s planners likely understood that the result of putting docks there would be the same problems as are now experienced by London, and have resisted expanding the system into that business district.

But most American cities have no choice but to include their primary, monofunctional, business districts in their bike sharing plans simply because those business districts are in the center of the city. It will be interesting to watch Washington, D.C. and other cities attempt to cope with the problem of the unidirectional commute as their inhabitants get used to biking to and from work, but London’s experience makes clear what they’re likely to experience.

Images above: London Cycle Hire bikes being moved about the city, by Flickr user Tom Anderson (cc); and Status of London’s Cycle Hire stations (17 and 18 August 2010), from OOBrien.com (cc)

» New applications require state commitment of at least 20% of costs for the first time.

For those searching for evidence that interest in high-speed rail extends beyond the borders of the District of Columbia, look no further than the announcement yesterday by the United States Department of Transportation that it has received 77 applications worth $8.5 billion for the agency’s next allocation of construction grants. States have oversubscribed to a program that only has $2.3 billion in Congressionally approved funds to distribute this year — and have done so after committing to paying at least 20% of project costs.

In January, the DOT released $8 billion in funds to a select group of projects; at that time, states submitted more than $100 billion in proposals. But there was no obligation then for states to contribute to those programs, thus this most recent announcement demonstrates a solidification of state support for high-speed rail.

The federal government is expected to announce the winners of the award dollars on September 30th.

This time around, ten states have submitted applications worth $7.8 billion for long-term, large-scale corridor development and eighteen states have asked for $700 million in construction-ready, relatively small-scale projects. Depending on their specific demands, states have submitted their requests in single or multiple applications. But all states will be required to demonstrate local support for one-fifth of project costs in order to receive federal grants. As calls for Congress to limit spending in the future seem to be increasing, there is a strong likelihood that the DOT will make such contributions mandatory when considering allocations from now on.

The free ride for federal stimulus grants has come to an end. And that’s a good thing, because only states that are investing their own funds should benefit from national dollars. In the past, the U.S. DOT has awarded states only a portion of the funds that they initially request because of a desire to distribute nationwide and a general limitation of overall funds.

States that have applied (the data on the chart above is incomplete, pending more information) generally represent the usual suspects. Florida and California, pursuing the nation’s only two true high-speed rail programs, each have requested more than one billion dollars. For Florida, a full grant award would mean enough money to complete the Tampa-Orlando high-speed project. Though the federal government is unlikely to provide the entire amount requested this fiscal year, the Obama Administration has made clear that it considers the Florida project one of the most important, since it will be the first fully new corridor and represent a milestone for fast train systems in North America. So the Sunshine State will undoubtedly get some money later this fall and the rest of the funds next year.

But California has made a much larger local contribution than its eastern peer, its voters having approved a $10 billion contribution to the San Francisco-Los Angeles corridor in 2008. The state’s $1.58 billion request is relatively minor considering the program’s more than $40 billion total cost and the fact that the federal government has only approved $2.34 billion thus far. But the state is clearly limiting its ambitions; California has asked for $582 million for corridor improvements along existing intercity rail corridors and $1 billion for one of four new high-speed corridors.

California’s move may also be motivated by an interest in pushing away from the state’s responsibility the decision about which section of the full San Francisco to L.A. line to begin with. Four projects “of independent utility” are feasible for a cost of about $1 billion, including the electrification of the existing Caltrain line between San Francisco and San Jose; the construction of new track between Los Angeles and Anaheim; the construction of new track between Bakersfield and Fresno; and the construction of new track between Merced and Fresno. Each of these projects will be necessary for the full program, but if that is put off for years or even decades, these projects will be operable alone.

Yet the High-Speed Rail Authority likely wants to avoid picking one to prioritize since that would make it appear interested in one part of the state more than another; that’s why the federal government is asked to decide, a smart political move. From that perspective, Washington has a hard choice: If it picks one of the former two sections, in the Bay Area or Los Angeles metropolitan areas, it would be doing more for people today on commuter routes; on the other hand, if it picks one of the latter two sections, in the Central Valley, it is more likely to aid more in the completion of the full high-speed program.

New Jersey has asked for $885 million, mostly for the Portal Bridge project that will increase capacity along the Northeast Corridor.

Illinois and Iowa have applied jointly for a $248 million grant to connect Iowa City, the Quad Cities, and Chicago with a new intercity rail route. This project would eventually allow two daily round trips between the destinations with maximum speeds of 79 mph.

Other states have submitted minor applications for less noteworthy projects. New York has a number of small projects on its priority list that would, among other things, replace signals between New York City and Albany; construct new stations in Schenectady and Niagara Falls; and improve track in the Syracuse area. North Carolina has asked the federal government to provide $290 million to improve the main line between Raleigh and Charlotte with new bridges and track improvements for better stations in several cities. Connecticut wants $220 million to match the $260 million it has already pledged to improve services along the corridor between New Haven, Hartford, and Springfield. Michigan has a series of projects worth $385 million (of which the federal government would pay $308 million) to speed operations between Chicago and Dearborn. And Massachusetts has requested $32.5 million to expand its South Station from 13 to 20 tracks.

Other projects have been submitted for funding as well but I do not have information on them at this time.

With the exception of Florida and California, each of these applications represents steady but not radical improvements in the nation’s existing passenger rail system. All of them are reasonable investments, especially since states have committed to paying some of the costs, but funding limitations at the U.S. DOT will continue to be an obstacle in the way of real advancements towards true high-speed rail.

Map updated 28 August

» This week’s big news. Open thread in the comments.

Follow my Twitter account (@ttpolitic) to get news in real time.

On The Transport Politic:

• Transportation user fee model obsolete, but no solution on the horizon
• Jacksonville’s transit future, at least for now, is in bus rapid transit
• Dallas compromises, finding funds for some light rail projects
• Overselling the benefits of high-speed rail

New Directions for the Old South series on Next American City:

• Raleigh’s downtown upgrade pans out
• Raleigh’s streetscape renewal, part of an integrated effort to transform downtown
• Knoxville’s Market Square shows pedestrian-only spaces can work, too

Politics

• Setting a different tone, Ohio Senator George Voinovich (R) calls for an expansion of the federal gas tax for transportation, describes Robert Cruickshank on California High-Speed Rail Blog. Of course, virtually no one else in power agrees with the plan and Voinovich will retire early next year.
• Transportation can play an important role in electoral politics. Joe Sestak (D), running for one of Pennsylvania’s Senate seats, promotes high-speed rail as a campaign initiative. Governor Martin O’Malley (D), running for re-election in Maryland, argues that two transit lines set him apart from his competitor.
• Seattle Mayor Mike McGinn, who has promised his constituents a vote on the expansion of light rail service to West Seattle, will likely not be able to stage a referendum next year. Opposition from City Council is causing problems.

Big Things

• Chinese authorities announce that all of their high-speed rail lines will eventually be operationally profitable. The first corridor, from Beijing to Tianjin, will set the precedent later this year.
• Stuttgart’s €4 billion project to reshape the way intercity trains move through the city gets underway. The program has met lots of opposition because it requires the demolition of part of the existing terminal for the construction of a huge underground concourse.
• Dallas provides a beautiful visualization of its airport light rail connection, now finally funded according to news this week. On a far smaller scale, the expansion south to downtown Bayonne of the Hudson-Bergen light rail line in Northern New Jersey is planned to be completed by this fall.

Image above: Nashville’s Music City Circuit stopped at waterfront rail station, by Yonah Freemark

» Richard Florida proclaims high-speed rail the economy-maker of the 21st Century. But he’s promising too much.

I write about transportation every day, and in doing so I try to emphasize its importance in defining not only the way people get around but also how they live. On this site and on others I have repeatedly extolled the value of high-speed rail; I truly believe that its full implementation the United States would represent a significant improvement in the lives of a large percentage of Americans. Yet I have tried to avoid portraying it, or any transportation mode, as being in itself a radical bearer of change.

Thus I cannot help but be skeptical of Richard Florida’s most recent article in The New Republic, in which he asserts that high-speed rail is the engine of the next “great reset” in the economy. Florida, of Creative Class fame, is no stranger to hyperbole, but can we truly be expected to believe his contention that high-speed rail will be the fundamental factor in producing the “spatial fix” necessary to redefine the economy for the next generation? Just how seriously should we take his argument that “High-speed rail… is the only infrastructure fix that promises to speed the velocity of moving people, goods, and ideas while also expanding and intensifying our development patterns“?

Florida’s essay is framed around the idea that in the post-World War II era, “Home ownership provided a powerful form of geographic Keynsianism;” the association between the car and the single-family house, the author argues, was the fundamental economic principle that defined the way the U.S. advanced as a society and brought to it the tremendous material wealth it enjoys but also the “Over-investment in housing, autos, and energy” that plagues it. Extending the conclusion that well-designed infrastructure begets progress, Florida asserts the importance of the megaregion as the next tool — the “New way of life and a new geography” — for framing economic growth, and suggests (as has been done many times before) that high-speed rail is its ideal companion. He argues for a much larger national commitment to its development.

Setting aside the positives and negatives of fast trains for now, my biggest qualm with Florida’s argument is his sense that the megaregion will produce the “Concentration and clustering [that] are the underlying motor forces of real economic development.” He cites the Boston-Washington and Char-lanta regions as examples of these megaregions, which he says “Will do more than anything to wean us from our dependency on cars.”

While I don’t dispute the claim that has been made by organizations like Brookings in the past that the vast majority of growth in the U.S. economy will come from within ten or so of these megaregions, I do question how one can conclude that their further development will upside the existing reliance on automobiles and single-family homes. Indeed, the Boston-Washington megaregion already exists as such, and with the exception of a few vibrant city-center cores, the preponderance of growth within them over the past six decades has been in the form of suburban sprawl.

Assuming that we agree with Florida that higher density living is an essential part of defining future American land use, megaregions are arguably not the path to get there.

Though there was been an increase in the number of residents living in the dense cities along the corridor (those that Florida implies need to be reinforced to meet the demands of the next century), that expansion is minor compared to the increase in the number of residents living in not-so-dense areas. It is true that the interconnections between cities in the Northeast have led to strong intercity rail ridership compared to the rest of the country, but the true success, especially of the New York metropolitan area, has been in maintaining urban and commuter rail ridership, which represents a far larger quantity of users and which has nothing at all to do with the presence of the greater Boston-Washington megaregion. The megaregion in itself, in other words, cannot be directly correlated with the notions of higher density.

Moreover, there is some evidence that the megaregion actually produces relatively higher rates of automobile use than other development patterns. The Boston-Washington corridor has morphed into one continuous band of development — this is the definition of the megaregion — and the result is that people who don’t live in places directly adjacent to rail are likely to drive to get to other places in the area, and this will remain generally true no matter how fast the trains travel. Other development models based around high-speed rail, such as the French scheme which enforces urban cores separated by dozens or hundreds of miles of countryside, seem more likely to produce a switch from automobile use since there is simply put nothing for most people to see or do between the cities, and that’s where fast trains really show their benefits.

So even if high-speed rail enforces the megaregional form, are we sure that we want it?

Returning to a discussion of high-speed rail in general, Florida’s focus on the mode isn’t badly conceived per se; I agree with the argument he has made in the past that this form of transportation will reduce commuter travel time and congestion even as it cleans the air. When compared in the long-term to other transport modes under the assumption that “the cost of doing nothing is not zero,” it comes out as the most effective travel mode for intercity travel distances of up to six or seven hundred miles.

But the mode does have its downsides if improperly implemented, and it does not bring the “great reset” Florida attributes to it. There is  evidence that in some places high-speed rail has led to further dispersal and in some cases increasing suburban sprawl. Faster travel times allow the creation of geographically larger commute markets. Just as important, fast trains have been around for decades in France, Japan, Italy, and Germany; whatever their merits, are those countries “more ready” for the 21st Century than the U.S. and other non-high-speed countries?

Moreover, a commitment to high-speed rail may change the way Americans get between their cities, but it will not do much at all in altering the way they move within them — and the vast majority of travel is between destinations within a dozen or so miles, not several hundred. Without a comprehensive change in the way the entire transportation apparatus is funded in the U.S., high-speed rail will result in few of the “spatial fixes” Florida highlights as his future goal. Indeed, there is no immediate connection between intercity rail use and giving up private cars; I have argued before that fast trains do not automatically mean an increase in public transportation use to and from stations, in the same way as different airports have different percentages of commuters using cars to get to them depending on the travel offerings available.

While there will be increasing dense development around stops, the fact of the matter is that fast train systems by definition have few stations, certainly not enough to encourage the brunt of overall nationwide development, even if implemented at a vast scale. That’s because, unlike the auto and single-family home model of the previous century, high-speed rail assumes dense, walkable development that falls off after a mile at most. One high-speed rail line cannot produce the same amount of geographic development as one highway.

Yet most problematic about Florida’s argument is his inability to identify improved fixed-route urban transit as the more efficient promoter of the anti-sprawl. While they are not as sexy as fast trains, rapid transit in the form of buses, subways, and light rail more directly allows for the creation of dense urban zones that do challenge the hegemony of the automobile and single-family home. If Florida’s intention were to do the most with a limited amount of funds to increase the number of livable, walkable neighborhoods, for instance, he would do best by encouraging the construction of these inner-city lines, combined with a focus on dense construction around their stations. From that perspective, high-speed rail is of secondary importance.

I write this piece with some reluctance — I do not want to come across as a high-speed rail skeptic, since I appreciate the mode’s benefits and its general importance, and I am in favor of a major ramp-up in public spending to support it. But there is value in being honest about what it can and cannot do.

Update: Richard Florida has responded briefly to this post, mostly in agreement, on his CreativeClass.com website.

» Link to airport and extension of Blue Line south, delayed indefinitely earlier in the summer, now back in line for funding. Yet transit agency plans reduction in light rail frequencies even as it expands.

Dallas and its airport, it seems, are inexorably linked in the minds of regional leaders, so the idea that the city’s transit system would fail to extend to the airport was, simply put, hard to understand. Facing decreasing sales tax revenues, however, the DART transit system’s officials announced in June that they had no choice but to put off this long-planned connection.

Yet this week brought better news as DART President Gary Thomas revealed that through a series of cost-cutting measures, the agency would be able to afford both the airport rail link by 2014 and the extension of the Blue Line light rail corridor south to the University of North Texas by 2019. The Green, Orange, and Blue Line extension projects now under construction were never threatened.

The compromise? Other proposals, including a second downtown rail corridor and further extensions of the Blue, Red, and Green Lines — as well as a new corridor extending into West Dallas — remain off the table as they are simply too expensive to consider because DART must find $8.8 billion in overall economies over the next twenty years. More significant for current users is the decision to decrease light rail frequencies on all lines to every fifteen minutes during peak hours (down from ten), a choice that will save $5.6 million annually but reduce the appeal of taking the train for most trips. Some bus services will also see a cut.

The plan has been sent to DART member cities for review; it is likely to be approved later this year.

In moving forward with the airport link, DART will be pursuing a politically popular project that, if not completed, could have resulted in the decision by some cities to abandon their membership in the agency, depriving it of vital sales tax revenues. Yet it is poor policy to endorse a major construction program even as services are being cut; in other words, what’s the point of building track that will be used by only a few trains a day?

But one can imagine the political pressure in which DART decision-makers find themselves: The agency must fulfill the interests of its most suburban constituents, many of whom are frustrated that they have yet to receive their personalized light rail line. Meanwhile, because the airport connection appeals most strongly to the political leaders of the region because it is the only transit line most of them will ever use, it is essential for DART to pursue its construction if it wants to remain in the funding game.

Yet operations cutbacks do have their negative consequences. The decision to cut headways on light rail operations has justified DART’s decision to permanently postpone the D2 downtown light rail link, which would have relieved the existing center-city trunk route used by all lines. That project, it seems, is not necessary if all lines are running only every fifteen minutes; in addition, the creation of a new streetcar system already partially funded through the federal TIGER program will add capacity for downtown riders. So the agency has determined that it is preferable to divert spending on an extension of the Blue Line south to the University of North Texas instead.

That project, though, will only further enforce the already very suburban orientation of DART’s expansion program rather than improve the circulation of people within the densest parts of Dallas. In addition, it seems to imply that fifteen-minute frequencies are acceptable in the long-term; they certainly are not if Dallas ever intends to encourage significantly increased public use of its light rail system, which has cost more than $2.5 billion to build so far. Why not, some will likely argue, save up and spend on the new downtown alignment as soon as possible, which would allow an eventual ramp-up in services to meet growing demand?

There may not be enough money to pay for D2 compared to the cheaper Blue Line extension right now, especially since the latter corridor may be able to acquire federal funds to pay for a portion of its overall costs, a feat the downtown corridor is less likely to match. But the Dallas region could hold off on its decision about the best route until the mid-2010s, when it will begin actual engineering work on either line to be built.

The agency may still alter its proposals, of course. But a true revival of frequencies along the light rail routes — the best way to increase ridership — will require an increase in funding. In its long-term plan, DART assumes some improvements in its financing thanks to a plan to assess taxes on utility bills, new charges at parking facilities, and introduce high-occupancy toll (HOT) lanes. Yet the region might want to rethink the way it funds rail lines in general; now that most of the basic system has been built, further extensions should perhaps be sponsored directly by each constituent city. If the City of Dallas wants a downtown link instead of the south Blue Line, it should make the decision and then pay. DART should perhaps content itself with the responsibility of ensuring steady offerings of rail and bus services throughout the service area.

Like many metropolitan areas engaged in the pursuit of an improved public transportation network, the Dallas region must find a way to compromise its desire to expand its rail offerings to meet the needs of as many suburban interests as possible while also retaining adequate services along the existing transit system. Finding the right medium between the two will be a fraught process, especially in the midst of a recession.

» New segregated bus lanes downtown will form core of future regional system of rapid transit routes.

There was a time, just a few decades ago, when cities like Jacksonville, Miami, and Detroit imagined their future downtowns and saw elevated automated people movers running in and out of the most important destinations, getting “choice” travelers out of their cars and into what was seen then as a super-modern transportation apparatus that could restore the center city to its previous glory. Jacksonville got its Skyway back in the late 1980s and suffice it to say that it didn’t accomplish as much as its designers hoped: The system attracts fewer than 2,000 passengers a day and doesn’t even run on the typical weekend.

Fortunately, the local transit agency JTA has moderated its ambitions enough to put a priority on its bus services and has now introduced a plan for a realignment of operations along dedicated lanes in the central city. Bus lanes along short east-west and north-south corridors constructed at a cost of $12 million will open for service in late 2012, at which time most operations will be consolidated, as shown below. The result will be a significant simplification of the way buses travel through the center city.

In association with the implementation of rapid bus routes along routes extending north, southeast, southwest, and east from downtown, Jacksonville may be able to revolutionize its transit services by making them faster, more frequent, and easier to understand. In the downtown, virtually all routes will be easy to find rather than spread out seemingly at random; elsewhere, most operations will be concentrated on visible mainline routes. Other mid-size cities with limited public transportation offerings may benefit by imitating this approach. Jacksonville, despite a metropolitan area with a population of more than 1.3 million people, is only able to attract 37,500 daily bus trips today: It can use an upgrade seriously.

Jacksonville’s bus rapid transit proposals come in the context of a regionwide re-imagining of the role of public transportation in the area’s mobility systems. Planners are in the process of highlighting potential commuter rail and streetcar routes, extending out from an improved transportation center where multi-modal connections between these services, downtown trolleys, the Skyway, Amtrak, and Greyhound will be offered. Yet buses have clearly been given precedence here.

The city has already installed some dedicated bus lanes, but the four new routes planned, in addition to the downtown corridor, will feature a vastly improved experience for the typical rider: Ten to fifteen minute headways, big and well-marked stations, transit signal priority, better signage, and queue jumps at intersections. With stations only every one to two miles on the major corridors, travel times will be significantly sped up. The four-part program, to begin with the North line, will cost a total of $74 million and be completed by 2016 if the Federal Transit Administration approves aid for the system. Funding is not yet assured.

The efforts of this north Florida city to improve its transit offerings will undoubtedly increase the use of buses among the population simply because the clarity offered by the obvious bus corridors, reliable services, and more significant stations will encourage people to consider public transport. In addition, the creation of bus lanes is likely to improve the streets by including the installation of trees and more generous sidewalks, both of which will make for a better pedestrian experience. Downtown, the immediate consequence of the project will be the removal of 75 parking spaces.

The downtown focus of the new transit system is in part a reflection of the users of the existing network, in which 80% of riders start or end their trips in the center-city, and in part a recognition that only in the largest cities can frequent bus lines work between peripheral locations. There’s nothing wrong with the logic there.

One potentially problematic effect of the route consolidations, however, will be a reduction in direct service by the north-south lines (the first to be implemented) to the heaviest-used sections of downtown, including Hemming Plaza, where the city hall, library, and museum are located. Though bus riders will only be asked to walk a few blocks to get there — and could arrive there directly via a transfer to the Skyway or one of the downtown bus circulators (a “choice” mode) — the fact that the new downtown bus lanes will intentionally skirt around downtown clearly puts them at a competitive disadvantage. Despite Jacksonville’s interest in improving its bus network, other modes are still being prioritized, though it should be noted that the east-west routes will run within one block of the square.

Is the message that people using the regular buses should stay out of the most vital part of the city? Or is the road alignment chosen for the bus lanes simply a direct result of the simplification of bus routes?

Whatever the answer, the willingness of this auto-oriented city to invest in bus related improvements is a sign of the general growth of interest in making the regular transit system work first before moving on to more expensive projects. Indeed, it is refreshing to see Jacksonville push these investments before demanding a streetcar or commuter rail line, both of which would likely benefit fewer passengers.

Images above: Proposed Jacksonville downtown bus alignments, from JTA

» Even as GAO reveals that nearly all states received more federal allocations than they contributed to the Highway Trust Fund, Congressional inaction continues. Supposed alternatives, like L.A.’s 30/10 plan, don’t address core issues.

Here’s how the Highway Trust Fund was supposed to work, back when it was created in 1956 to fund the Interstate Highway System: Congress would redistribute annual revenue from a series of fuel taxes on a proportional basis to states to cover the majority of construction costs of freeways from Maine to Montana. Over the past five decades, that system has worked well enough both to construct the United States’ massive roads system but also to keep it in relatively adequate condition — all by relying only on fees covered by direct users of the system. The understanding, theoretically shared by both drivers and politicians, was that the road system “paid for itself.”

Over the last few decades, however, that relationship has become increasingly tenuous. In 1983, the Mass Transit Account was created to fund public transportation with one out of every nine collected cents from drivers going to support rail and bus projects. In 1993, a 4.3¢ increase to the tax was allocated towards deficit reduction rather than transportation (though the money was eventually directed back towards roads in 1997). In the past two years, though, the user fee system has met its most challenging situation yet: Because of a refusal of the Congress to approve tax increases, a decrease in overall vehicle miles traveled, and an increase in the fuel efficiency of vehicles, the Highway Trust Fund is now paying out more than it collects for the first time — to virtually every state, according to the Government Accountability Office.

For proponents of the idea that federal transportation spending should be self-supporting, these facts come as a serious blow. They put in question both assumptions about the manner in which transport is funded in the United States and the long-term viability of that funding.

The biggest obstacle faced by the American transportation system is simply that we have run out of money to pay for it. The Congress has made little effort to advance any reauthorization of highway and transit allocations because of an unwillingness throughout the process to identify any tax increases that would be politically acceptable enough to pay for the system. The general fund has become the de facto financing source (leading to the aforementioned situation in which states contribute less in fuel taxes than they receive), but support for its continued use, despite its merits, remains unclear, leaving the whole transportation program in the lurch.

This situation has been exacerbated by the Obama Administration’s steadfast failure to support any tax increases during the recession: Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood declared late last month that not only is no fuel increase in the cards, but also neither is a vehicle miles traveled fee, the only realistic alternative. Mr. LaHood argued that tolls could fill the gap — but there are structural impediments blocking that idea; more significantly, the federal government has no direct control over road tolls, so any increase in funds would go to state governments, not the national government.

Though states have the potential to be strong supporters of public transportation, they currently have shown little interest in doing so, even in the most progressive states. Apart from municipal and metropolitan governments, the overwhelming contributor to the financing of transit capital projects has been Washington.

Recently, two new alternatives have been promoted. Ken Orski, an Associate Administrator of the Urban Mass Transportation Administration (now FTA) in the 1970s, commented last week in his Innovation Briefs that Los Angeles’ 30/10 transit plan was one significant option, since it promoted “fiscal independence” by allowing the federal government to “facilitate” but not be responsible for the financing of transit in ten years through low-interest loans that would eventually be paid back through thirty years of tax revenues. This argument has been repeated by several other sources.

This discussion, however, is disingenuous, since it does not reflect the fact that each of the public transportation projects being proposed for Los Angeles, from the Westside Subway extension to the Crenshaw Line, will require a financial commitment from Washington through the New Starts grant program. In other words, the federal government must still find the money to pay for these projects through direct funding — through 30/10, Los Angeles is just trying to speed the process up. This could potentially make the situation worse for the already cash-strapped U.S. Department of Transportation, since it would only increase the immediate demand for more national transportation funds!

Meanwhile, Orski points to the proposal of the libertarian Reason Foundation to simply direct all transportation funds raised through the fuel tax — including those currently used for transit projects — towards a “results-oriented” “Interstate 2.0″ highway program. This proposal is a reflection of Reason’s sense that Americans “have lost trust in the Trust Fund,” a sense that only conservatives seem to share, based on the understanding that it is unreasonable to use driver user fees to pay for bike, pedestrian, and public transportation projects.

This is a dangerously anti-multimodal point of view that fails to reflect the fact that there are significant benefits to the nation as a whole to invest both in highway and transit projects, no matter the source of revenue used to pay for them. Moreover, it does not consider a political reality that lobbies for the roads and public transportation are mutually dependent; there must continue to be a role for both in any future federal transportation financial structure.

I do not have a miracle solution to these problems other than to suggest once again that if the government wants to support a well-maintained national infrastructure, there is no choice but to increase taxes to do so — most of the “alternatives” are either just as reliant on federal investment as is the current system or represent an overall reduction in spending, the exact opposite of what is necessary. While it may be politically inconvenient to force through a tax increase, whether that means on fuel or income taxes, the United States has no real choice but to do so if it continues to desire a functioning transportation network.

Image above: Highway and rail Seto Bridge, in Kagawa Japan, from Flickr user tataquax (cc)

» Though rail will play an important role for the San Francisco center, the project’s bus focus sets it apart. The existing almost windowless building will be replaced with a blocks-long glass façade.

Cities have few opportunities to invest in new transportation centers, since they’re enormously expensive and usually require a complete reworking of the transit system during construction and after they’re built. For big metropolitan areas, a new transportation center usually means a series of multimodal connections focused around a rail link; in most cases in which they’re present, trains get the priority placement in the building whereas buses are frequently relegated to less desirable areas.

For example, Denver’s Union Station redevelopment project (recently financed with $304 million in U.S. government-backed bonds) will require bus passengers to wait in a underground passage, even as commuter and light rail users are presented with better-looking and better-lit spaces. This leaves bus riders in the lurch, losing out in terms of the general environment that surrounds them, despite often representing a larger percentage of overall passengers.

San Francisco has taken the opposite approach with its Transbay Transit Center, whose construction will get underway early next year, in time for an initial opening in 2017. The first phase of the project, which will cost $1.589 billion, will include five levels of concourses and platforms stretching four blocks in the center of the city, featuring a beautiful 5.4-acre roof park sitting on top. Buses will get priority, running elevated above the surrounding streets and accessible directly from the ground floor via escalators lit by skylights. People waiting on buses will be literally standing above the city streets, facing windowed panels. This will be no repeat of the all-too-familiar dark and confusing transit hub.

On the other hand, trains will be routed underground at Transbay; Caltrain and California High-Speed Rail trains will use the almost $3 billion downtown rail extension corridor, to be completed in 2018, to reach into the center city. That project is not yet fully funded but will be necessary to fulfill the goals of downtown connectivity for the high-speed project. In addition, its provision of easier access into the central business district will likely ramp up ridership on Caltrain, which currently terminates at an inconvenient station at the intersection of 4th and King Streets. That stop will be replaced with an underground through station.

100,000 passengers, mostly traveling on buses headed to or from the East Bay, are expected to use the facility everyday. They will do so in a far more friendly atmosphere than they’re currently used to. Buses to other parts of San Francisco will likely use drop off locations at the ground floor.

Over the course of the next seven years, bus riders will be required to use the Transbay center’s temporary bus terminal, which has been under construction since 2008. On August 13th, the existing building, called the Transbay Terminal, will begin to be torn down. The Terminal opened in the 1930s as the terminus of many of the streetcars of the Key System coming over from cities in the East Bay like Berkeley and Oakland. Those vehicles — and the Terminal itself — were converted in 1959 to buses both because of the sense that streetcars were an antiquated transportation technology but also because of the anticipation for BART regional rail services, which began in 1972. The Terminal hasn’t aged well; for the average user, it’s a complicated mess of corridors with little signage.

What’s exciting about San Francisco’s huge investment in the Transbay Center is that it seeks to integrate transportation into the community by routing it through a facility that will be a fantastic destination, even for occasional visitors. In addition to the building itself, the city plans to remake Folsom Street nearby to encourage streetfront cafes and a convivial pedestrian environment. Even more significantly, it has rezoned 40 acres in the immediate surroundings for major redevelopment, preparing for the construction of the city’s tallest building on site. Combined with the rooftop park, this will be a new center of life for the city — and buses will be at the heart of the program.

Cities that want to exploit their bus services to their full potential have an obligation to treat the transportation mode with spaces that are as high quality as are those provided for rail users, and that’s exactly what San Francisco plans to do here. If BART trains reach capacity over the next decade — a possibility if the economy improves and ridership increases — better bus service operating in and out of the Transbay Center could be a viable alternative for many passengers hoping to get to the East Bay. They’ll be more likely to ride thanks to the airy and magnificent nature of the new station.

There is one significant problem with the project: It will not have adequate connections with the rest of San Francisco via the existing transit system. No BART or Muni Metro lines stop there, nor is the bus rapid transit system for Geary Boulevard expected to continue there. One solution could be a new Transbay tunnel for BART, combined with rail service under Geary. That, however, is so far off that no one’s ready to contemplate it seriously yet. We’ll have to content ourselves with using buses to get to and from the building. Here, that’s not too bad of a deal.

Image above: Transbay Transit Center, from TJPA

» In pulling out, engineering firm SNC-Lavalin cites concerns that project wasn’t going to have its operations subsidized.

For investors interested in infrastructure projects these days, there is apparently a lot of low-hanging fruit to pick. This, at least, is the argument made by Montréal-based contractor and engineering firm SNC-Lavalin, which has pulled out of a years-long commitment to operating Toronto’s planned airport connection train because the regional transportation authority refused to subsidize the service.

The construction of a new two-mile corridor between an existing rail track and the airport was to be fully paid for by government investment. The Canadian federal government pushed a public-private partnership (PPP) deal for the project’s operation in the early 1990s in exchange for a commitment for national funds to back up local money.

According to an SNC-Lavalin spokesman, “When there are so many other infrastructure projects that are proceeding at this time, the banks are not interested in projects without a fixed income stream.” This leaves regional transit agency Metrolinx in charge of the program’s implementation and responsible to pay for operating shortfalls if necessary. Other transportation organizations hoping that assembling a PPP will allow for a transit operation with no public subsidy should put their dreams in check.

Once the Air-Rail Link opens in 2015 in time for the planned Pan-Am Games, it will offer 22-min service between downtown Toronto’s renovated Union Station complex and Pearson Airport at 15-minute frequencies over a 15.5-mile corridor. The Air-Rail Link is an integral part of the overall upgrade of the Georgetown South corridor, which will eventually allow up to 400 commuter trains to use this line that extends into the city’s northwestern suburbs.

The irony of the loss of SNC-Lavalin’s involvement since 2003 through a subsidiary called the Union-Pearson Air Link Group is that it may in reality mean fewer public expenditures than originally foreseen. Metrolinx, which is also pursuing the Toronto region’s ambitious expansion of rapid transit, claims that it can get the project built for a lower cost than SNC-Lavelin had estimated. In addition, if fares are high enough, the operation may well be able to make money, in which case the profits will go to the public sector instead of into the hands of a corporation.

If Metrolinx is indeed able to save money by relying on its own expertise instead of that of an engineering firm, it may be able to transfer some already committed funds to the electrification of the line — a long-sought improvement for residents of the surrounding area, who claim to be choking on diesel fumes. In addition, the transit agency has the opportunity to refine its decision-making about who will use the line; does it want to price the service high, providing premium benefits like downtown baggage check-in? Or is it interested in reducing costs to attract as many riders as possible? Metrolinx will be able to alter the financial structure of the service over the years to adjust to changing conditions, something that would not have been feasible under a long-term fixed PPP.

The public agency has the added benefit of being able to take advantage of its existing facilities to keep up the line; even if it buys new trains, it can store and maintain them in the same buildings used by GO Transit commuter trains. It can take advantage of its already existing team of experts to make sure the tracks stay in order. So there are some significant benefits to exiting from the PPP deal.

In the context of increasing discussions about the role of the private sector in the creation of public infrastructure, Toronto’s example may be worth considering. The refusal of Metrolinx to agree to subsidize the operations of the Airport link rang the death knell for the financing scheme of a project that was supposed to be self-funded thanks to its primary clientele, relatively wealthy air travelers. This, of all transit projects, should be able to make up its operating costs. But the deal evidently was not good enough for SNC-Lavalin.

Lyon’s Rhônexpress program, now under construction in southeastern France, may be the only truly sustainable model for private investment in such an airport line. There, the corporate sponsor contributed some of the construction dollars up front in exchange for an annual public subsidy. This guaranteed contribution from the taxpayers, spread out over a long time period, may be the only way to convince corporations to be involved in a PPP process in the usually profitless transit world. A more open-ended situation, in which it is simply assumed that a private operator will be able to make money over the long-term, does not seem likely to attract much interest.

Image above: Map of Georgetown South rail project, from GO Transit